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This paper tests the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis regarding retirement 
expectations of married older American couples, controlling for sample selection and 
reporting biases. In prior research we found that individual retirement expectation 
formation was consistent with the Rational Expectation hypothesis, but in that work 
spousal considerations were not analyzed. In this research we take advantage of panel 
data on expectations to test the RE hypothesis among married individuals as well as joint 
expectations among couples. We find that regardless of whether we assume that married 
individuals form their own expectations taking spouse’s information as exogenous, or the 
reports of the couple are the result of a joint expectation formation process, their 
expectations are consistent with the RE hypothesis. Our results support a wide variety of 
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1. Introduction 
 
Most of the literature on joint retirement is concerned with tests of the appropriate 
behavioral model to explain actual retirement behavior of married couples.  There are numerous 
competing theoretical hypotheses regarding joint retirement behavior that vary in their treatment of 
the relationship between the utility functions of the two individuals. The motivating empirical 
phenomenon is that husbands and wives tend to retire together, but there is no conclusive evidence 
in favor of any of the competing hypotheses, which defend either some type of bargaining model or 
a leader-follower model, in explaining this phenomenon  (Hurd 1990, Gustman and Steinmeier 
1994 and 2000, Blau 1997 and 1998, Blau and Riphahn 1998, Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and 
Meghir 1998, Berloffa 1999, Coile 1999, Costa 1999, Benítez-Silva 2000, Blau and Gilleskie 2001, 
Maestas 2001) Most of these researchers seem to coincide on the importance of complementarity of 
leisure, and on the relevance of going beyond the individual-based model. In this paper we do not 
directly address the reasons behind the joint outcomes for married couples, but instead by analyzing 
joint expectation formation we focus on how the planning behind those future outcomes evolves. 
We examine how couples expectations of retirement evolve over time, and ask whether they 
do in accordance with rationality.  We test models of Rational Expectations (RE) using all five 
available waves of the Health and Retirement Study on married couples’ plans for retirement.  We 
do this for married individuals taking the spouse’s information as exogenous as well as for joint 
expectations formation. This is the first study we are aware of that tackles the issue of joint 
retirement expectations directly. We find that the results are consistent with the RE hypothesis after 
controlling for measurement error and sample selection biases. 
  There has been relatively little work done on expectation formation. Bernheim (1990) 
focuses on expectations formation to test individuals’ rationality, and he cannot reject the 
hypothesis of strong rationality, meaning that only new information affects individual changes of   2 
expectations regarding Social Security receiving benefit levels.
1  In a prior paper we build on 
Bernheim’s model of expectations formation, and on the tradition of Muth (1961), Lucas (1972), 
and the rational expectations revolution, to argue that testing whether past retirement expectations 
are a sufficient statistic for current retirement expectations is indeed a test of the RE hypothesis.
2  
In that work we also use the full longitudinal Health and Retirement Study, and use 
Instrumental Variables and a modified selection corrected IV estimator to deal with issues of 
selection and reporting biases. In that work we find that individual plans are consistent with the RE 
hypothesis.  But one weakness of that work is that we treated each member of a married couple 
individually and only controlled for marital status, which was often significant in explaining 
retirement outcomes and expectations. In this work we extend that research to test for RE among 
married couples.  
Notice, that we do not directly address the issue of how to include the spouse’s information 
into a behavioral model of retirement.  We do not ask how the responses to retirement expectation 
in the survey came about, but rather test for the rationality in those responses.  In doing so, we 
simply implement a RE test that suggests that all of the information should be captured in the 
previous period’s expectations, even after controlling for the spouse’s expectations, and that 
regardless of the process that each family member, or the family as a whole, used to come up with 
an expectation of retirement (either as the result of a bargaining process, or one of them being the 
                                                 
1 There is a growing body of research that is using expectations variables for a variety of research endeavors, including 
and analysis of the connection between Social Security expectations and retirement savings (Dominitz, Manski, and 
Heinz 2001, Lusardi 1999), the relationship between retirement expectations and retirement outcomes (Bernheim 1989, 
Dwyer and Hu 1999, Disney and Tanner 1999, Coronado and Perozek 2001, Hurd and Retti 2001, Forni 2002, Dwyer 
2002, and Mastrogiacomo 2003), the analysis of fertility expectations and pregnancy outcomes (Walker 2003), the 
analysis of wage and income expectations (Dominitz and Manski 1996 and 1997, and Das and van Soest 1997 and 
2000), and to understand consumption patterns after retirement (Haider and Stephens 2003, and Hurd and Rohwedder 
2003). 
2 See Benítez-Silva & Dwyer (2003) for a discussion of the connections of this approach with the traditional rational 
expectations literature, Benítez-Silva, Dwyer, Gayle, and Muench (2003) for an extension of the results using different 
expectations questions with different populations and data sets, McCallum (1980) for a survey of the early 
contributions, and Manski (2003) for a recent discussion of the importance of analyzing expectations formation.   3 
leader and the other the follower, or some other process), that the relationship between the 
retirement expectations of husbands and wives evolve rationally over time. 
Our results support the growing literature on dynamic modeling, and models that rely on 
some form of a rationality assumption to solve for, simulate, and eventually estimate the parameters 
of an economic model of behavior.  Most of those models when applied to household retirement 
decisions assume rational expectations, and also assume that some type of joint model is more 
appropriate, our results validate the underlying assumption of joint rationality and therefore support 
the household level approach to retirement research. 
The conceptual model and the econometric specifications are presented in the next section. 
Section 3 provides information about the data used in the empirical analysis, and Section 4 reports 
our main findings. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks and discusses avenues of future 
research. 
 
2. A Model of Expectations Formation and a Rational Expectations Test 
 
Suppose first, that an individual and an econometrician are trying to predict a variable X that the 
individual has decided will be determined by a function of a sequence of random variables:
 3 
12 ( , ,..., ). T Xh ω ωω =     (1) 
The sequence of vector-valued variables inside the parenthesis will be observed by the individual at 
time periods t=1,2,…,T. Then the individual will take action X after some or all the ωt’s have been 
observed.  
                                                 
3 This borrows, in part, from Benítez-Silva and Dwyer (2003).   4 
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where E is the expectations operator. This is the most commonly used representation of the RE 
hypothesis, which takes as the rational expectation of a variable its conditional mathematical 
expectation (Sargent and Wallace 1976).
4 This guarantees that errors in expectations will be 
uncorrelated with the set of variables known at time t. 
  Variables included in the vector representing the information set Ω, come from models of 
individual retirement behavior (see for example Lumsdaine and Mitchell 1999) and might include 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Using the law of iterated expectations and 
assuming that the new information is correctly forecasted by agents (its conditional distribution not 
just its mean), from (2) we get: 
, ] | , [ 1 1
e
t t t t t t
e
t X X E X E E X E = Ω = Ω Ω = Ω + + ω    (3) 
where ωt+1 represents information that comes available between periods t and t+1. Without this 
additional assumption expression (3) would not be correct. We are going to test this assumption 
jointly with the more standard RE hypothesis, once we also assume linearity of the process 
presented in (3). Notice that the assumption of correct forecasting is in essence no different from the 
assumption in the early RE literature; namely that forecast errors are normally distributed with 
mean zero, in a specification that regresses outcomes of a particular market variable on its 
expectations and a constant.  
                                                 
4 Schmalensee (1976) using experimental data emphasizes the importance of analyzing higher moments of the 
distribution of expectations. Due to data limitations we are unable to do so in our analysis.   5 
Then from (3) we can write the evolution of expectations through time as 




t X X η    (4) 




t t X E X Ω − = + + + η  and therefore E(ηt+1|Ωt)=0.  Notice that ηt+1 is a function of the 
new information received since period t,  ωt+1. From this characterization of the evolution of 
expectations we can test the RE hypothesis with the following regression: 
1
1, , , 1,
ee
t i ti ti t i XX α βγ ε ++ =+ + Ω + , (5) 
where α is a constant, and γ is a vector of parameters that estimate the effect of information in 
period t on period’s t+1 expectations. The RE hypothesis implies that α=γ=0, and β=1. A weak RE 
test, in the terminology of Lovell (1986) and Bernheim (1990), assumes that γ is equal to a vector of 
zeros, and tests for α=0 and β=1––effectively testing whether expectations follow a random walk. 
The strong RE test is less restrictive and also tests for γ=0. 
In this setting married individuals are pooled with those divorced, single or never married, 
and only a binary indicator for marital status is included in (5) as part of Ω
1. However, in reality, 
spouse’s information is likely to matter, including the spouse’s retirement expectation. Assuming 
that the retirement expectation reported by the spouse is a summary statistic for the variables 
determining that expectation, we can try to integrate that response into the model presented above. 
We can test the RE hypothesis in the same way as for individuals if the spouse’s information 
and plans are exogenous to the individual’s process.  That means that if the individual takes the 
spouse’s information as given and then forms expectations over that information, the spouse’s 
variables can be treated as any other exogenous variables and the RE test remains essentially the 
same, where we would be estimating 
1, 1 1, 2
1, , 1 , 2 , 1,
ee s s
t i ti s ti s ti t i XX α βγγ ε ++ =+ +Ω+ Ω , (6)   6 
where we will assume that the information set of the variables corresponding to the spouse, 
1, 2 s Ω , are summarized by the retirement expectation response we observe in the sample.
5 The 
predictions of the model are still essentially the same as in the individual level model, α=γs1=γs2=0, 
and β=1. 
However, if we believe that the spouse’s information is summarized by the retirement 
expectation he or she reported, and we believe that that expectation may be the product of the 
couple’s joint planning, then the spouse’s information would be endogenous in the specification of 
the RE test presented in (6).  The error term would be correlated with both the spouse’s information 
as well as the previous own expectation, thereby biasing the coefficient of interest, in this case β.   
If couples plan jointly, then a more appropriate test of rationality would test for the 
rationality of joint expectations, so rather than starting with an expected retirement age for a given 
individual ,
e
t X we will use a measure of joint retirement age, in our case the difference between the 
number of years remaining until the person reaches the expected retirement, for each of the spouses. 
For couples of the same age, this measure is equal to zero when they plan to retire at the same time, 
and different from zero when they plan to retire one year apart or more. We will then be estimating 
modifications of equations (5) and (6), in this case 
11
1, 1 1, 1 1, 2 1, 2 , 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 2 1, ( ) ( ) (( ) ( ))
ee e e
ts ts ts ts t s t s t s t s s t s s t s ti X Age X Age X Age X Age α βγ γ ε ++ ++ + −− −= + − − −+ Ω + Ω +
             ( 7 )  
where a weak RE test will assume that γs1=γs2=0, and test whether  α=0 and β=1. The strong RE test 
will also test whether γs1=γs2=0 along with the tests of the constant and the main coefficient of 
interest, β. 
                                                 
5 However, we do provide as sensitivity analysis, results where the spouse’ variables are directly included in the 
estimation.   7 
Notice, again, that the results of these tests cannot directly shed light on the debate of what 
is the underlying model followed by households to decide when each partner will retire. What we 
are testing is whether joint expectations evolve over time in a way consistent with rational 
expectations. Those expectations can be the product of any of the underlying models presented in 
the literature. However, it is also important to notice that all those models assume the rationality of 
those expectations, and therefore our test is highly relevant and potentially valuable to that 
literature. 
Econometric Specifications 
Estimating (5), (6), and (7) is in principle straightforward but the likely presence of 
measurement error in the dependent variable and its lag and sample selection, complicate the 
methodology. We are concerned about reporting errors that may be correlated with measurement 
errors in other factors. Some assumptions underlie the identification of the coefficients of interest in 
the presence of these two econometric concerns. First, we will be assuming that the measurement 
error that individuals incur in is in no way correlated with the rationality of their expectations 
formation process but has more to do, for example, with the differences across individuals in the 
true meaning of retirement. In the case of the selection problem we are making the implicit 
assumption (and this is true in any econometric application that tries to solve the selection bias 
problem à la Heckman 1979, and wants to make a statement about the general population under 
analysis) that those that do not respond the question of interest would use the same process to 
analyze information if they were to actually answer the question as those that answer the question. 
Meaning that those that we do not observe answering the expectations questions are not following a 
completely different model (maybe irrational) to decide their retirement ages, but instead that for a 
number of observable and unobservable reasons they did not report our dependent variable.   8 
Here we follow the methodology presented in Wooldridge (2002, p. 567) to consistently 
estimate the effect of previous expectation on current expectation, and from (5) we write 
1, 1 , 1 ,1 1,1
ee
ti t i t i t i XX Z αβ γ ε ++ =+ + + ,    (8) 
, 2 1 ,1 2 ,2 ,2
e
t i ti ti ti XZ Z α λ γ ε =+ + + ,     (9) 
i i t i Z Y 3 3 , 3 3 ε γ α + + = ,       ( 1 0 )  
where we first estimate the selection equation (10) using a probit specification, where Yi is equal to 
one if both the expectation in period t and the expectation in period t+1 are observed, which means 
that the individual answers a question about his or her future retirement. Z3 in equation (10) includes 
all the exogenous variables and any exclusion restriction of the selection equation with respect to 
the structural equation (8). We then consistently estimate (8) by performing a modified 2SLS 
procedure, where the first stage includes as instruments all the exogenous variables used in (10), the 
Inverse Mills’ ratio from the probit equation, and any additional instruments, Z2 in (9), the validity 
of which will be tested. 
It is straightforward to see how equations (8) to (10) will be modified in order to estimate (6) 
and (7) in the presence of measurement error and sample selection. If we assume the spouse’s 
information, in this case the retirement expectations reported by the spouse, is exogenous then we 
would estimate the system below by a modified 2SLS procedure 
12
1, , 1 , 2 , 1,
ee s s
t i ti s ti s ti t i XX Z Z αβ γ γ ε ++ =+ + + ,    (11) 
12
, 2 1, 2, 2, 2 , 2
es s
ti ti ti t i t i XZ Z Z α λλγ ε =+ + + +,      ( 1 2 )  
i i t i Z Y 3 3 , 3 3 ε γ α + + = ,        ( 1 3 )  
as before Z3 in equation (13) includes all the exogenous variables and any exclusion restriction of 
the selection equation with respect to the structural equation (11).   9 
Then, if we estimate the joint expectations model in the presence of measurement error and 
sample selection we estimate the following system of equations using the same modified 2SLS 
methodology 
1 ,1 1 ,1 1 ,2 1 ,2 ,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 1 ,1 2 ,2 1 , ( ) ( ) (( ) ( ))
ee e e
t s t s t s t s ts ts ts ts s ts s ts t i X Age X Age X Age X Age Z Z α βγ γ ε ++ ++ + −− −= + − − −+ + +
                                  (14) 
12
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 1 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 () ( )
ee s s
ts ts ts ts ti ti t i t i X Age X Age Z Z Z α λλγ ε −− −= + + + +                          (15) 
i i t i Z Y 3 3 , 3 3 ε γ α + + = ,            ( 1 6 )  
where the notation borrows from the other two characterizations of the problem. 
In all cases our objective is to estimate consistently and efficiently the main parameter of 
interest, β, and in this paper we concentrate in the estimation of that parameter in equations (11) and 
(14).   
 
3. Data 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 
7,700 households headed by an individual aged 51 to 61 as of the first round of interviews in 1992-
93. So far five waves of data are available, and we use all of them in our analysis.
6 The primary 
purpose of the HRS is to study the labor force transitions between work and retirement with 
particular emphasis on sources of retirement income and health care needs.  It is a survey conducted 
by the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan and funded by the National 
Institute on Aging.  The data for the respondents are merged from wave 5 backwards to waves 4, 3, 
2, and 1, and we construct a set of consistent variables on different sources of income, financial and 
non-financial wealth, health, health insurance, and socio-economic characteristics that will be 
assigned to each decision maker appropriately.     10  
We include any observation for respondents that are married and both individuals are working, 
full time or part time, in any wave and non-employed (but searching for jobs) that report retirement 
plans. We exclude respondents who do not report retirement plans for more than two consecutive 
years and for whom we observe relevant information, which results in around 11,000 person-period 
observations once missing values in the main variables of interest are considered. We construct 
relevant dependent and independent variables for each wave.
7 
In each wave respondents are asked when they plan to fully or partially depart from the labor 
force.
8 They are also asked if they thought much about retirement. These questions are not mutually 
exclusive, but most of the people who have not thought about retirement do not report an expected 
age.
9 A non-trivial number of individuals report they will never retire, although these same people 
often change their minds at some point and report an age.  The analysis could potentially be 
sensitive to how we treat "never retire" since we need to put in some older age that we select 
arbitrarily.  We have assigned an age of 77 for those who never retire (estimated longevity), but our 
results are robust to screening out this group and correcting for the selection into it. 
Expected retirement ages are distributed similarly to actual retirement ages with peaks at ages 62 and 65 
as well as a peak for the bunching at 77 for those who never plan to retire.  Over time these expectations 
converge to between 62 and 65 with fewer people maintaining plans of retirement before age 62 or after age 
65. Table 1a and 1b provide an analysis of how these expectations compare with a number of retirement 
measures for the population of HRS respondents (see also for example Panis 2002). Interestingly, 
expectations are much more concentrated on the traditional peaks than actual retirement which, except for a 
measure that uses the age at which individuals start to receive Social Security, is much smoother. In any case, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 In the last two months, wave 6 (collected in 2002) of the data has become available as a preliminary release. For the 
moment we are not integrating this new wave of information in our estimations. 
7 If there are missing values for one wave we use the prior wave of information, but we only go back one wave. 
8 In wave 1 they were only asked about a full departure. 
9 Many of them report that they will never retire.  If they have not given it any thought, and they say they will never 
retire, we treat their expected retirement age as missing.  If they give a retirement age we treat them as non-missing.   11  
besides the apparent focal points that ages 62 and 65 play when people form expectations, it seems clear that 
retirement expectations are measuring retirement itself. 
As indicators of economic status, we construct variables of net worth and household wealth.  
We also control for income for the respondent. We use health limitations, self-ratings, as well as a 
number of disease indicators and activities of daily living to control for health status.  We also use 
the self-reported probability of living to age 85 as a measure of the individual's time horizon, which 
may be correlated with health status. Hurd and McGarry (1995) find this variable to be highly 
correlated with own health status and parent mortality. 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics on the pooled sample by sample selection criteria.  Those 
who are in the sample are more educated and in higher socioeconomic groups than those who have 
not thought about retirement.  They are in slightly better health and their spouse’s are significantly 
healthier. The average expected age of retirement is 64 for those who have thought about it and 65 
for those who have not (a possible focal point given Social Security policy). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Rational Expectations of Married Individuals 
Table 3 reports the weak and strong RE tests for the full sample of married individuals.  In 
these models we assume that the spouse’s information is exogenous to the formation of expectations 
of the married individual.  The data support the weak and strong RE hypotheses only in the 
augmented models that correct for measurement error in the report of expected retirement age, and 
also in the model that also corrects for the possible selection bias, resulting in a corrected IV 
specification.
10   
                                                 
10 The findings are robust across many specifications and empirical techniques including panel data methods.  Much of 
the individual component is explained by time-invarying variables (there is no remaining individual component in a 
random effects model if we exclude these covariates).  The justification for including these time-invarying components   12  
Notice that we perform an F-test based on the null hypothesis that β=1 in equation (11), to 
test the RE hypothesis. We obtain coefficients for beta of 1.08 for the weaker test, which cannot 
reject the hypothesis that expectations follow a random walk. For the pooled OLS estimation the 
weak test is effectively a unit root test, and as such, and following the literature on testing unit roots 
in panel data surveyed by Bond, Nauges, and Windmeijer (2002), we have to perform a correction 
to obtain the appropriate critical value. However, this matters very little since the unit root 
hypothesis is soundly rejected.   
In the OLS specification of the strong test, the spouse’s previous expected retirement age 
plays a significant role in explaining future expectations along with own prior expectations.   
However, once we control for the measurement error that is potentially biasing these results, the 
effect of the spouse’s information is not significantly different from zero, therefore this additional 
restriction of the RE hypothesis cannot be rejected, which suggests that the informational content of 
that variable is already embedded in the respondent’s own expected retirement report.   
For the strong test we estimate the model of equations (11) to (13), using the Corrected IV 
procedure. The beta parameter is estimated to be equal to 1.059, which fails to reject the RE 
hypothesis. Notice, however, that selection bias does not seem to be a major problem, and that the 
IV estimator delivers essentially the same results. We also report in the table tests that show that we 
cannot reject that we have robust instruments and that the overidentification in the 2SLS is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
in the test is because they may be correlated with other time-varying unobservables. However, due to collinearity 
problems it was necessary to remove age from the list of covariates in the second stage of the IV and corrected IV 
procedure. As Vella (1998) discusses, this might be due to the fact that age in our sample has a fairly small range, 
leading to the apparent linearity of the inverse Mills’ ratio. We are therefore assuming that age is a proxy for the 
information set, and only matters in terms of making you more or less likely to think about retirement, but does not 
directly affect the expected retirement age.   13  
correct.
11 In fact the reported results are the product of robustly estimating the system of equations 
via GMM, which provides robustness against unknown forms of heterokedasticity.   
The strong test includes information available at time t that should not be significant after 
controlling for time t expectations. Significance would imply that this factor was not incorporated in 
the previous period’s expectations and implies underutilized information.  After controlling for 
sample selection and measurement error we find that most of these factors are no longer significant, 
in fact only wealth is. The joint hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to zero cannot be 
rejected at any traditional level of significance in the IV or the corrected IV specifications.
12 
The objective behind instrumental variables estimation here is to correct for potential 
measurement error in the reported expected age of retirement at time t, as explained in more 
detailed in Section 2. Since people are reporting expectations over uncertain events, we expect some 
degree of reporting error that may be correlated with unobserved factors.  In fact, Bernheim (1988) 
finds that expectations are reported with noise. Like in Bernheim (1990), we correct for this 
problem using instrumental variables analysis.  The instruments must be correlated with the 
expected retirement age but not with the error term or any new information relevant to the t+1 
expectation.  We use time t subjective survival to age 85 probabilities and an indicator of smoking 
behavior as instruments and exclusion restrictions for expected retirement age, and in the 
specifications of the strong test we also use the individual’s age and the age of his or her spouse as 
instruments. In the selection corrected IV, the inverse Mills’ ratio is included in the estimation, 
along with the rest of the exogenous variables from the selection equation, as suggested by 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of how to test the robustness of instruments and the overidentifying restrictions see Bound, Jaeger, 
and Baker (1995), Staiger and Stock(1997), Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002), and Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002). 
12 It is true, however, as in Bernheim (1990) that this is trivially the case if individuals never adjust their expectations. 
But plenty of adjustment goes on in the data, and it seems implausible that all can be blamed on measurement error.   14  
Wooldridge (2002).
13 The IV and the selection corrected IV specification deliver similar results.
14 
This is not surprising, given the lack of statistical significance of the Inverse Mills’ Ratio. The first 
stage results, reported in Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2., in the Appendix, suggest that selection bias is 
present in the estimation of the weak test. Table A.1., also in the Appendix, presents the results of 
the selection equation used in estimating the corrected IV specification. 
For completeness, Table A.3., in the Appendix presents the results of estimating the same 
specifications as in Table 3, but instead of including the expected retirement age of the spouse as an 
explanatory variable, we include a battery of spouse’s variables. We can clearly see that the main 
results do not change much in this specification. Again, the IV results are the preferred ones, and 
the RE hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Tables 4 and 5 present results of the same specification as Table 3 but for males and 
females, respectively. Although we are assuming in all these specifications that the spouse’s 
information is taken as exogenous, by estimating separate models for males and females we can 
analyze whether the spouse’s expected retirement is internalized asymmetrically by the two 
genders. Almost all results are very similar in both tables, in both cases the predictions of the RE 
hypothesis cannot be rejected and the IV estimator is the preferred one. The main difference is that 
for males the spouse’s retirement expectation as of time t still has informational content after 
controlling for own expected retirement, and a large number of covariates. This is not the case for 
females, where the point estimates are considerably smaller and very close to zero, but estimated 
                                                 
13 The exclusion restrictions in the selection equation include indicators for whether the father and mother of the 
respondent reached retirement age. In the selection equation we have decided to only include covariates as of time t, we 
have experimented with including t+1 variables, and also a battery of residuals of the regressions of t+1 variables on 
their lagged values, which are then also included in the main equation. Although some coefficients in the main equation 
changed as a result of these modifications, the results reported in the paper are robust to this characterization of the 
selection process. 
14 Notice that in columns two and three of Tables 3 to 6, we do not report the adjusted R
2 measure of fit. This is 
common practice, but it is rarely mentioned in empirical work. These types of measures do not have independent 
significance in structural estimation à la IV, given that we are after estimating population parameters, which we   15  
with much less precision. This result could suggest that males form their retirement expectations 
more independently of the partner’s expectations than females. However, the weak statistical 
significance of the results, prevent us from drawing more definite conclusions.
15 
  
Rational Expectations Test using Joint Expectations 
  When we test the RE hypothesis of the evolution of joint expectations, defined as the 
difference in years to expected retirement between the couple, we obtain a similar pattern of results 
for the strong and weak test, and we are unable to reject the RE hypothesis once we control for 
measurement error, and the same is true when we also control for sample selection. In the IV 
specification the result of the weak test is a β coefficient of 0.989, and in the strong test is 1.048. 
From the table we can observe that due to the small number of observations the standard errors of 
the IV specification and the Corrected-IV specification are quite large, especially for the strong test 
in the Corrected-IV model, which leads to the result of not being able to reject the RE hypothesis. 
Notice, however, that in all cases the point estimates are very close to what the model under the RE 
hypothesis predicts. 
It is important to emphasize that due to the way we are defining the dependent variable in 
this specification, the OLS estimates are likely to be pushed towards 0, since any change from no 
difference to some difference, or vice-versa, has to be fitted with a very small coefficient for the 
lagged difference. This problem is solved when using IV and the corrected IV technique. Finally, 
notice that from the coefficient of the Inverse Mills’ ratio we can conclude that selection is not 
                                                                                                                                                                  
consider invariant to the particular way of identifying the parameters (instruments), not after minimizing a particular 
prediction problem. See Ruud (2000, p. 515-516 for a discussion)  
15 Tables A.4., A.4.1., and A.4.2., present the selection equation and first stage results of the IV and corrected IV results 
corresponding to the results presented in Table 4. Tables A.5., A.5.1., and A.5.2., do the same for the results presented 
in Table 5.   16  
biasing the estimated coefficients, and therefore we can rely on the IV results as our preferred 
specification. 
Both for the IV and the corrected IV specifications all specifications show that we have 
robust instruments, that the overidentification restrictions cannot be rejected, and that the rest of the 
coefficients that complete the RE hypothesis also have the hypothesized statistically significant 
magnitudes. 
Finally, Tables A.6, A.6.1, and A.6.2, provide the selection equation used in the corrected 
IV estimator and the first stage results for the weak and strong tests of the IV and corrected IV 
specifications presented in Table 6. 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Research 
This is the first study we are aware of that analyzes joint retirement expectations. We use these 
expectations to test the RE hypothesis in the formation of retirement expectations for older married 
American couples using the HRS, and we cannot reject this hypothesis after controlling for 
reporting errors and sample selection. These results support the use of a wide variety of models that 
use this assumption to analyze joint retirement decisions, and for dynamic models of couples’ 
decision making that are often heavily reliant on rational expectations assumptions. 
Our research abstracts from the debate over the appropriate underlying model of decision 
making in the household, since our tests take the process followed to report a retirement expectation 
age by individuals and couples as given. We find that regardless of the process, the evolution over 
time of those expectations is consistent with the rational expectations paradigm. We believe there is 
no reason to expect that different underlying models of decision making at the household level 
would have different implications for the rationality of the retirement expectations reported by 
married couples.   17  
The results in this analysis are meant to foster further discussion and research on the issues 
surrounding the role of expectations and rationality in economic modeling both for individuals and 
married couples. We have provided a methodology to test the validity of these variables, but we 
believe there are still a number of open questions that researchers in the area, including ourselves, 
will be tackling, we mention a few below. 
Recent results using expectations for different populations, variables, and countries seem to 
indicate that both individuals and couples update their expectations, regarding micro level variables, 
according to the Rational Expectations hypothesis. However, at the same time the analysis of 
deviations between expectations and realizations seem to be pointing in the opposite direction. This 
can be considered a puzzle worthy of further research, which we conjecture is likely to be related to 
the fact that expectations and realizations of an apparently similar variable can be understood very 
differently by individuals, and also because issues of selection are not always appropriately 
modeled. Also, in some cases, and depending on the question of interest, the process of updating of 
expectations can be much more complex than what we have presented in this paper. For example, in 
the analysis of fertility expectations and realizations it is difficult to discard a model of learning as 
more appropriate, since individuals update their expectations regarding the number of children they 
want to have as they experience an initial realization, which is likely to bring many unexpected and 
almost impossible to predict events that can affect the expectations they report. This could 
potentially be going on among older married couples, as one member of the household maybe has a 
chance to observe how his or her partner deals with retirement before he or she decides to retire, but 
at the time an update of expectations is reported.
16 
In this paper we have concentrated on how individuals form expectations over a micro-level 
variable, which after all, they have some control over but that is affected by uncertainty over a   18  
number of dimensions. The challenge is to integrate this approach with the more traditional 
approach of forming expectations over market level or even macro variables. For example, how do 
expectations over possible Social Security reform affect the retirement behavior of individuals and 
couples? In recent work, Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2003) suggest that the presence of this 
expectations could explain part of the rather radical shift of the Social Security claiming age toward 
the Early Retirement Age, if this is the case it means that individuals are forming expectations over 
a variety of uncertain events, some of which are in part under their control, but some of them that 
can be considered macro level uncertainty. Some researchers have started to analyze the role of 
expectations over social insurance reform (Bütler 1999, and Phelan 1999) but the two types of 
expectations have been rarely modeled together. 
Finally, a growing area of interest is trying to understand how these expectations can be used in 
models of individual behavior, paying special attention to the behavioral and econometric 
implications of including this type of variables in their models. The first efforts (which are still 
likely to continue for some time) have focused in validating the use of these variables, the next step 
is to use the informational content they provide to better identify our economic models of interest.
                                                                                                                                                                  
16 See, for example, Pesaran (1987), and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for illuminating expositions of learning models.   19  
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Table 1.a. Distribution of Retirement Expectations and Actual Retirement. All respondents. 
 
































































































































#  Obs.  3,708 3,256 2,808 2,230 1,753  5,346  3,967  4,902  6,404 
W1 to W5: the expected retirement age reported in the respective rounds of data. 
Self-R Ret.: reported retirement age when individuals are asked about their employment status. 
Social Sec.: age at which they started to receive Social Security benefits. 
Fully Retired: answer to a direct question regarding when did they fully withdrawn from the labor force. 




Table 1.b. Distribution of Retirement Expectations and Actual Retirement. Without the nevers. 
 






















































































































#  Obs.  3,374 2.740 2,328 1.901 1,449  5,346  3,967  4,902  6,404 
W1 to W5: the expected retirement age reported in the respective rounds of data. 
Self-R Ret.: reported retirement age when individuals are asked about their employment status. 
Social Sec.: age at which they started to receive Social Security benefits. 
Fully Retired: answer to a direct question regarding when did they fully withdrawn from the labor force. 
Full and Partial Retirement: includes partial retirement in the above definition. 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics by Sample Selection. Married Respondents 
 
Variables Thought  About 
N=2,299 
Not Thought  
N= 9,527 
Retirement Plans and Outcomes 
   Expected retirement age 
   Spouse’s Expected retirement age 
   Employee  
   Self employed 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Economic factors 
   Net worth (in $100,000) 
   Housing wealth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent’s Income (in $1,000) 
   Has a private pension  
 
Health Insurance 
   Employer Provided 
         Retiree 
   Government 
   Private 
   No health insurance 
   Spouse 
 
Health factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-Very Good-Excellent Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to age 85 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Arthritis  
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 
   Stroke  
   Heart Problems  
   Cancer  
   Smoke 
   Spouse health limitation 
   Spouse good-very good-excellent
 
    
Demographic factors 
   Age  
   Male 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Mother reached retirement age 
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Table 3. Tests of Rational Expectations- All Married Respondents. 
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
 
Strong RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget  
Expected Ret. Aget of the Spouse 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Wave 1-2  
   Wave 2-3 
    
Adjusted R
2 
Test of Joint Sig. of Covariates 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 



























































































Cannot Rej. P-v=.683 














































Cannot Rej. P-v=.7083 
Cannot Rej. P-v=.1217 
Reject P-v=.0000 
1,456 
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Table 4. Tests of Rational Expectations- All Married Male Respondents. 
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
 
Strong RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget  
Expected Ret Aget Spouse 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walk. multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Wave 1-2 
   Wave 2-3 
    
Adjusted R
2 
Test of Joint Sig. of Covariates 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
Number of Observations 
Reject 























































































Cannot Rej. P-v=.1626 











3.15607  (6.47210) 
1.1949  (0.1864)** 
-0.10994   (0.0585)* 
-6.0349   (5.9123) 
 
 
0.0625   (0.0452) 
-0.00961   (0.00531)* 
3.626743   (2.31) 
-.3091457   (0.612388) 




-1.4278   (0.591)** 
-0.29736   (0.967) 
0.0887    (0.0406)** 
0.5317   (0.667) 
-0.9077   (1.108) 
2.491   (2.9766) 
0.2231   (1.3015) 
-0.7073   (0.937) 
-0.04741   (0.645) 
0.81248   (1.1067) 
3.2938   (1.587)** 
 
 
0.55508   (0.961) 
-0.153   (0.596) 





Cannot Rej. P-v=.1854 
Cannot Rej. P-v=.2941 
Reject P-v=.0000 
744 
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Table 5. Tests of Rational Expectations- All Married Female Respondents. 
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
 
Strong RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget  
Expected Ret Aget Spouse 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes  
   Cancer 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walk. multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Wave 1-2 
   Wave 2-3 
    
Adjusted R
2 
Test of Joint Sig. of Covariates 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 























































































Cannot Rej. P-v=.1625 












































Cannot Rej. P-v=.2149 
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Table 6. Tests of Joint Rational Retirement Expectations. The dependent variable is the difference, 
in years, to expected retirement. 
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Diff. in Expected Years to Ret.t 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
Strong RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Diff. in Expected Years Ret.t  
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   Spouse’s Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Pension - Spouse 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Health limitation - spouse 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Hlt. 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Hlt. Spouse 
   High blood pressure 
   High blood pressure - Spouse 
   Diabetes    
   Diabetes - Spouse 
   Stroke 
   Heart problems 
   Heart problems - Spouse 
   Arthritis 
   Arthritis - Spouse     
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   BA - spouse 
   Professional Degree 




Test of joint Sig. of Covariates 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
Number of Observations 
Reject 
2.620 (0.388)** 






















































































Cannot Rej. P-v=.1686 













































Cannot Rej. P-v=.113 
Cannot Rej. P-v=.863 
Reject P-v=.0011 
N=415 
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Table A.1.  Selection Equation – Probability of Thinking about Retirement. Table 3. 
 
Variables Probit  Marg. 
Effects 
Economic Factors 
   Net wealth (in $100,000) 
   Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-Employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health Factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to 85 
   Diff. walking multiple blocks 
   Diff. climbing stairs 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart problems 
   Arthritis 
   Smoke 
    
Demographic Factors 
   Age 
   Male 
   White 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Mother reached retirement age 
   Father reached retirement age 
   Wave 2 
   Wave 3 
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Table A.2.1.  First Stage Results for Weak RE Test using IV. Married Respondents in Table 3 
 
Variables 1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Constant 
Prob. Of Living to 85 
Smoking 
Age 
Age - spouse 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walk. multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Table A.2.2.  First Stage Results for Strong RE Test using IV. Married Respondents in Table 3 
 
Variables  1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Constant 
Expected Ret. age of spouset 




Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
    
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walk. Mult. blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Table A.3. Tests of Rational Retirement Expectations. Married Respondents. Sensitivity Analysis 
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
Strong RE Test (H0: exp t =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget  
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   Spouse’s Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Pension – spouse 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation - own 
   Health limitation - spouse 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Hlt. Resp. 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Hlt. Spouse 
   High blood pressure 
   High blood pressure - spouse 
   Diabetes    
   Diabetes - spouse 
   Stroke 
   Stroke - spouse 
   Heart problems 
   Heart problems - spouse 
   Arthritis 
   Arthritis - spouse     
   Cancer 
   Doctor visit  
   Diff. walking multiple blocks 
   Diff. walking mult. blocks-sp. 
   Diff. climbing stairs 
   Diff. climbing stairs - spouse 
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   BA - spouse 
   Professional Degree 
   Prof. Degree – spouse 
   Wave 2 























































































































































Test of joint Sig. of Covariates 
Test of joint Sig. of Cov. Spouse 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 










Cannot Rej. P-v=.9297 






Cannot Rej. P-v=.771 




   34  
Table A.4.  Selection Equation–Probability of Thinking about Ret. Married Males in Table 4 
 
Variables Probit  Marg.  Effects 
Economic Factors 
   Net wealth (in $100,000) 
   Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-Employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health Factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to 85 
   Diff. walking multiple blocks 
   Diff. climbing stairs 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart problems 
   Arthritis 
   Smoke 
    
Demographic Factors 
   Age 
   White 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Mother reached retirement age 
   Father reached retirement age 
   Wave 2 
   Wave 3 
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Table A.4.1.  First Stage Results for Weak RE Test using IV. Married Males in Table 4 
 
Variables 1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Constant 
Prob. Of Living to 85 
Smoking 
Age 
Age of the spouse 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walk. multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Table A.4.2.  First Stage Results for Strong RE Test using IV. Married Males in Table 4 
 
Variables  1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Constant 
Expected Ret. age of spouset 
Prob. of living to 85 
Smoking 
Age 
Age of the spouse 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health  
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walk. Mult. blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Table A.5.  Selection Equation–Probability of Thinking about Ret. Married Females in Table 5 
 
Variables Probit  Marg. 
Effects 
Economic Factors 
   Net wealth (in $100,000) 
   Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-Employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health Factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to 85 
   Diff. walking multiple blocks 
   Diff. climbing stairs 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Cancer 
   Heart problems 
   Arthritis 
   Smoke 
    
Demographic Factors 
   Age 
   White 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Mother reached retirement age 
   Father reached retirement age 
   Wave 2 
   Wave 3 
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Table A.5.1.  First Stage Results for Weak RE Test using IV. Married Female in Table 5 
 
Variables 1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Constant 
Prob. Of Living to 85 
Smoking 
Age 
Age of the spouse 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walk. multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Table A.5.2.  First Stage Results for Strong RE Test using IV. Married Females in Table 5 
 
Variables  1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Constant 
Expected Ret. age of spouset  
Prob. of living to 85 
Smoking 
Age 
Age of the spouse 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health  
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walk. multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Table A.6.  Selection Equation- Probability of Thinking about Retirement. Table 6 
 
Variables Probit  Marg. Effects 
Economic Factors 
   Net wealth (in $100,000) 
   Income (in $1,000) -Resp. 
   Income (in $1,000) -Spouse 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-Employed 
   Pension-Respondent 
   Pension-Spouse 
Health Factors 
   Health limitation-Resp. 
   Health limitation-Spouse 
   Good-V.gd.-Exc. Hlth-Resp. 
   Good-V.gd.-Exc. Hlt.-Spouse 
   Doctor visits-Respondent 
   Doctor visits-Spouse 
   Probability of living to 85 
   High blood press.-Resp. 
   High blood press.-Spouse 
   Diabetes-Respondent 
   Diabetes-Spouse 
   Stroke-Respondent 
   Stroke-Spouse 
   Heart problems-Respondent 
   Heart problems-Spouse 
   Arthritis-Respondent 
   Arthritis-Spouse 
   Demographic Factors 
   Age-Respondent 
   Age-Spouse 
   Male 
   White 
   Bachelor’s degree-Resp. 
   Bachelor’s degree-Spouse 
   Professional degree-Resp. 
   Professional degree-Spouse 
   Mother reached retirement age
   Father reached retirement age 
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Table A.6.1.  First Stage Results for Weak RE Test using IV in Table 6 
 
Variables 1
st Stage of IV  1




Prob. Of Living to 85 
Smoking 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Income (in $1,000)-Respondent 
   Income (in $1,000)-Spouse 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension--Respondent 
   Pension--spouse 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation-Respondent 
   Health limitation-Spouse 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Hlt.-Resp. 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Hlt.-Spouse 
   High blood press.-Resp. 
   High blood pressure-Spouse 
   Diabetes -Respondent   
   Diabetes-Spouse 
   Stroke--Respondent 
   Heart Problems-Respondent 
   Heart Problems-Spouse 
   Arthritis-Respondent 
   Arthritis-Spouse 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree-Respondent 
   Bachelor’s Degree-Spouse 
   Professional Degree-Respondent 
   Professional Degree-Spouse 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Table A.6.2.  First Stage Results for Strong RE Test using IV in Table 6 
 
Variables  1
st Stage of IV  1




Prob. Of Living to 85 
Smoking 
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 
 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Income (in $1,000)-Resp. 
   Income (in $1,000)-Spouse 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension-Respondent 
   Pension-Spouse 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation-Respondent 
   Health limitation-Spouse 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Hlt.-Resp. 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Htl.-Sp. 
   High blood pres.-Resp. 
   High blood pressure-Sp. 
   Diabetes-Respondent   
   Diabetes-Spouse 
   Stroke-Respondent 
   Heart Problems-Respondent 
   Heart Problems-Spouse 
   Arthritis-Respondent 
   Arthritis-Spouse 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree-Resp. 
   Bachelor’s Degree-Spouse 
   Professional Degree-Resp. 
   Professional Degree-Spouse 
   
Adj. R
2 
Test of Weak Instruments 










































F(4, 387) =4.44 
419 
19.017(4.111)** 
-0.068(0.079) 
-0.175(0.060)** 
-0.375(0.926) 
0.648(0.746) 
-6.2896(4.629) 
 
 
0.044(0.062) 
-0.001(0.010) 
0.033(0.024) 
-0.966(2.056) 
1.120(0.666)* 
-0.477(0.881) 
0.149(0.753) 
-1.845(0.712)** 
 
 
0.923(0.718) 
-0.830(0.767) 
1.660(1.038) 
-0.234(1.227) 
-0.603(0.657) 
-0.483(0.721) 
-0.255(1.176) 
-0.701(1.724) 
-4.365(5.231) 
-0.254(1.020) 
0.761(1.125) 
-0.071(0.650) 
-0.121(0.654) 
 
 
-0.638(0.786) 
0.877(0.860) 
0.196(0.635) 
-0.230(0.705) 
0.277(0.887) 
-0.698(1.007) 
 
0.052 
F(4,382) =4.64 
415 
 
 